The AIDS epidemic threatens Kenya with a long wave of premature adult mortality, and thus with an enduring setback to the formation of human capital and economic growth. To investigate this possibility, we develop a model with three overlapping generations, calibrate it to the demographic and economic series from 1950 until 1990, and then perform simulations for the period ending in 2050 under alternative assumptions about demographic developments, including the counterfactual in which there is no epidemic. Although AIDS does not bring about a catastrophic economic collapse, it does cause large economic costs -and very many deaths. Programs that subsidize post-primary education and combat the epidemic are both socially profitable -the latter strikingly so, due to its indirect effects on the expected returns to education -and a combination of the two interventions profits from a modest long-run synergy effect.
Introduction
This paper analyses the prospects for the formation of human capital and economic growth in Kenya, even as the AIDS epidemic threatens that country with a long wave of premature adult mortality. It focuses, naturally enough, on the young. For young people in Kenya, as in most parts of the world, are confronted with a real choice between continuing their education and entering the labour market, and they usually have some say in that decision. At roughly the same time, they also become sexually active, with all the gratifications and risks that entails, including unplanned parenthood and contracting sexually transmitted diseases. Somewhat later, as young adults, they choose partners, have children and take on the responsibilities of family life.
The long wave of premature adult mortality is not the only factor imposing the time frame. What is called human capital is built up slowly, through a combination of child-rearing within the family and formal education during childhood and adolescence, and is then extended in some ways through experience on the job, especially in young adulthood. This gestation process far exceeds that connected with investments in virtually all forms of physical capital. Yet viewed statistically, the capital embodied in young adults is also strikingly durable -unless the hazards posed by accidents, violence and lethal communicable diseases are substantial.
Our approach assigns a central role, first, to the formation of human capital through a process in which child-rearing and formal education combine to produce the wellspring of long-term economic growth and, second, to premature adult mortality as the primary threat to that process. The victims of AIDS are overwhelmingly young adults or those in their early prime years, the great majority of them with children to raise and care for, so that the nature of the ensuing long-term threat to social well-being is clear.
For if parents sicken and die while their children are still young, then all the means needed to raise the children so that they can become productive and capable citizens will be greatly reduced. The affected families' lifetime income will shrink, and hence also the means to finance the children's education, whether in the form of school fees or taxes. On a parent's death, moreover, the children will lose the love, knowledge and guidance which complement formal education. AIDS does much more, therefore, than destroy the existing abilities and capacities -or human capital -embodied in its victims; it also weakens or even wrecks the mechanism through which human capital is formed in the next generation and beyond. These ramifications will take decades to make themselves fully felt: like the course of the disease in individuals, they are long-drawn out and insidious. For these reasons, expectations about the future course of mortality have a potentially decisive influence on investment in education.
History plays an important role in any long-run analysis, and there is a fairly complete account for Kenya from the middle of the 20 th century onwards. The salient features are the onset of rapid population growth and falling mortality (even before World War II), the acceleration, slowing and then decline of individual productivity, and the substantial but fitful expansion of education. The corresponding series provide much of the material that is indispensable, not only to the calibration of the model in Section 3, but also to the demographic projections in Section 4, the setting up of the benchmark cases in Section 5 and the analysis of policy interventions in Section 6.
The central emphasis placed here on the role of human capital is fully in keeping with Azam and Daubrée's (1997) finding that its accumulation was the main force that drove economic growth in Kenya between 1964 Kenya between -1990 . Their econometric analysis also reveals a sharp fall in the growth of total factor productivity in the second half of that period, which is consistent with the results of our calibration. It emerges from the latter that the slowdown and then subsequent decline in the economy after 1980 are attributable to two factors. First, there was a fall in the efficiency of the 'technology' for producing human capital young from inputs of schooling and the quality of child-rearing in the family (as measured by the parents' own level of human capital). Second, and with a lag, there was a fall in the productivity of existing human capital in producing aggregate output. Both bode ill for Kenya's prospects, quite independently of the outbreak of the AIDS epidemic.
Section 5 analyses two benchmark cases for the period 1990 to 2050, namely, the counterfactual in which the epidemic never arose and the world in which breaks out.
Neither involves any explicit form of intervention, though the latter rests heavily on the assumptions adopted by the researchers at the U.S. Bureau of the Census, whose projections form the basis of the benchmarks. AIDS does not bring about a catastrophic economic collapse, but it does inflict large economic costs -and very many deaths.
Independent, though indirect, support for our conclusion that the epidemic will exact a heavy economic toll is provided by micro-economic evidence that premature adult mortality in rural areas of Kenya has strongly adverse effects on school attendance and advancement from one grade to another. Yamano and Jaynes (2005) find the effect to be especially adverse among poorer households and young girls. Evans and Miguel (2005) , who use a still larger and in some ways more detailed panel, albeit one restricted to a single district in which the HIV-prevalence rate is high, confirm the former finding but not the latter. They also establish that maternal death produces a bigger setback than a paternal one, and that children whose test scores were low before bereavement are more likely to be withdrawn from school. The cross-country evidence for sub-Saharan Africa yields the same general finding where schooling is concerned; see, for example, Kalemli-Ozcan (2006) .
The question of how public policy can alter the course of the epidemic or mitigate its impact upon the accumulation of human capital is taken up in Section 6. Since health and education are clearly intertwined in this setting, the design of public policy should be concerned with both domains. The relationship between spending on combating the epidemic and the profile of age-specific mortality is speculative territory, for it involves the efficacy of various policy interventions that seek to reduce premature adult mortality. There is little research that addresses this relationship as we have formulated it, so we have drawn on work for South Africa (Bell et al., 2006) , which turns out to be transferable to Kenya. On this basis, we find that separate programmes to subsidise post-primary education and combat the epidemic are both socially profitable -the latter strikingly so, due to its indirect effects on the expected returns to educationand that a combination of the two profits from a modest synergy effect.
No single paper can hope to deal with all aspects of such a topic, so it will be helpful to say at the outset what will be left out. The intimate connection between risk-taking and demography in the context of AIDS is recognised, but not analysed: infection and demography are treated here as exogenous processes, in contrast to Young's (2005) study of the South African epidemic. Nor do we go into the bargaining that takes place between the young and their parents. Since some rule for determining outcomes is unavoidable, we adopt a simple one. We also steer clear of learning on the job as a contributing factor to the accumulation of human capital, and of youth unemployment as a barrier thereto. For contributions to the macroeconomic literature on AIDS that use an OLG framework in which agents can also invest in physical capital, the reader is referred to Méndez (2004, 2005 ).
The model
The model is a substantial extension of Bell, Devarajan and Gersbach (2006): there are now essentially three overlapping generations within an extended family, in which all surviving adults care for all related children. This arrangement reflects Kenya's social structure reasonably well. There are two levels of the educational system, with a corresponding elaboration of the process through which human capital is formed. In applying the model, moreover, we choose a still finer unit time period than a generation, namely, the inter-censal interval of a decade. This permits a relatively detailed treatment of demography, which plays a central role in the analysis.
Children are defined to be aged 5 to 14 (that is, centered on 10). This definition corresponds closely to the official span of primary education. The minimum school age in Kenya has been six for generations, and the period of primary schooling has likewise comprised eight years, with the exception of the interlude between 1966 to 1985, when it was a year shorter. Leaving out the five-year olds, assuming that many children, especially boys, will not be enrolled until their seventh birthday, and allowing for the fact that there has always been a fair amount of grade-repetition, full primary schooling according to schedule will nicely exhaust the decade in question.
An important object of this paper is to incorporate the effects, costs and benefits of human capital formation, especially among what can be called the 'youth', who are defined to be individuals aged 15 to 24. On reaching 15, the child has become a youth, put his primary education behind him and augmented his original endowment of human capital. A maximum of ten years is then available to build on this foundation before he settles into the duties and routines of mature adulthood.
Human capital and output
We begin by introducing some notation. N a t : the number of individuals in the age-group a in year t (a = 0 for 0-4 year-olds, a = 1 for 5-14 year-olds, . . . ., a = 6 for 55-64 year-olds, a = 7 for those over 64), λ a t : the human capital attained by an individual in age-group (a = 2, 3) in year t on completing the decade corresponding to primary and higher education, respectively, γ: the human capital of a school-age child, Some of these series and the associated sources have been discussed and set out in Bell et al. (2004) . Those for α t , γ, z t and λ t must be estimated as part of the calibration.
Two difference equations govern the system' dynamics. They involve the level of parents' human capital and the educational technologies, one for primary, the other for secondary and higher education. The evidence suggests that parents in Kenya have most of their children when they are in their twenties. Since the cohort of children in primary school is centred on 10-year olds, we form the level of their parents' human capital by taking the weighted average of the human capital of the age-groups a = 2, 3 in period t. The human capital attained by a child on becoming a youth (a = 2) in period t is given by
where f 1 (·) represents the educational technology at the primary school level and the transmission factor z 1 t for the cohort of school-age children in period t is defined with respect to the parents' combined human capital, normalised to a representative couple.
In the secondary and higher stages of the educational process, a plausible, general relationship is
where it is only the fully mature adults who influence the inter-generational transmission process at this stage. For the purposes of calibration, however, one needs a specification that is closely anchored to (1) . It is arguable that, in the present framework, the transmission parameter z a t does not vary much across educational levelsand anyway, there is no chance whatsoever of calibrating the model with the data available without the restriction z
Where the educational technology is concerned, the assumption that f 1 (·) continues to hold at higher levels of education, with argument e 1 t−20 + e 2 t−10 , seems rather implausible for the following reasons. The cohort of school-going age in 1980 had completed, on reaching adulthood, just over six years of education on average, and earlier cohorts fewer still. It is also known that net enrollment rates in secondary and tertiary education were very low until recently (they are still modest at best). Up to 1990, therefore, the position was e Then, corresponding to (1), we have Turning to aggregate output, this takes the form of an aggregate consumption good.
We assume its level is proportional to inputs of labor measured in efficiency units. A natural normalization is that an adult who possesses human capital in the amount 
where the scalar 0.9 reflects the fact that among the group a = 1, five year-olds can do very little in the way of useful work. The advantages of (3) are that it is free of any other behavioural assumptions and, if α t is specified exogenously, it is linear in λ a t (a = 2, 3) and γ. It also fully reflects premature mortality among adults, whatever be its causes.
The family's preferences and decisions
The next step is to specify the (extended) family's preferences and its decision-making rules. Some additional notation is needed. n t : the number of children born to a representative couple who survive to school age in period t, x q t : the probability that an individual aged t will die before reaching the age of t + x, q t : the probability that a young adult in period t will die before reaching the third phase of life, 
The said identity may then be written as:
where
is the 'price' of c t ,
is the 'price' of a unit of full primary education, and
can be interpreted as the 'price' of a unit of full secondary and tertiary education combined, all prices being normalised by N y t . The quantity
is the aggregate human capital of all individuals over the age of 14. The RHS of (5) is the level of so-called (normalised) full income in year t. It is seen that the demographic structure plays a potentially important role in determining both relative prices and the level of full income.
We turn to the question of who decides how to allocate current full income. As noted above, Kenya's parents have most of their children in their twenties and early thirties, so it is plausible that the age groups a = 2, 3 have the greatest say in making the decisions. Since the unit time period is a decade, the younger ones will be parties to a partial revision a decade later. To keep matters manageable, we assume that they take no heed of this fact when contributing to the current outcome. Observe also from (5) The young adults' preferences are, in principle at least, defined over four goods: the levels of consumption in young adulthood and old age, c t and c t+20 , respectively, and the human capital attained by their school-age children on attaining full adulthood (λ 3 t+20 ), which they may appreciate in both phases of their own lives. Investment in the children's education therefore produces two kinds of pay-offs, namely, in the form of altruism, as expressed by the value directly placed on λ 3 t+20 , and selfishly, inasmuch as an increase in λ 3 t+20 will also lead to an increase in c t+20 under the said social rules.
Although the pooling arrangement implicit in the extended family structure and the law of large numbers combine to eliminate some risks, others remain. A young adult still faces uncertainty about whether he or she will actually survive into the last phase of life, and whether his or her children will do likewise, conditional on their reaching adulthood in their turn. There is also arguably uncertainty about future demographic developments, which will influence the realised levels of c t+20 and λ 3 t+20 .
To make the analysis tractable, we resort to a number of further assumptions. First, and plausibly, the parents' altruistic motive makes itself felt in their preferences only when they themselves are young and actually make the sacrifices. Second, their preferences are additively separable in c t , ρc t+20 and λ 3 t+20 , and also conform to the expected utility hypothesis. Third, the partners making up the representative young couple in the extended family regard consumption in both phases as a private good, but the human capital attained by each of their children on attaining adulthood as a public good within the partnership. Fourth, in keeping with common practice in the macroeconomic literature, the sub-utility functions for consumption are logarithmic in form.
Fifth, the sub-utility function representing altruism through λ 3 t+20 belongs to the isoelastic family with parameter η:
where the fact that η is to be estimated lends the system substantial flexibility, especially by allowing the two types of sub-utility functions to exhibit different degrees of curvature. The preferences of a young adult at time t are then represented as follows:
where the taste parameters b 1 and b 2 are also to be estimated by calibration. It should be noted, first, that the 'pay-offs' in the event that the parent should die prematurely (with probability q t ), or that the children, in their turn, should die prematurely in adulthood (with probability q t+20 ), have been normalized to zero, and second, that c t+20 is also a random variable for those who survive into old age, by virtue of the fact that its level depends on a whole variety of future economic and demographic developments.
The individual takes all features of the environment in periods t and t + 20 as parametrically given. It will be helpful to summarize the latter in order to distinguish between what the individual knows and what he or she must forecast. The current environment is described by the vector
This assumed to be known. The future environment, as described by the vector
must be forecast, where it should be noted that forecasting N a t+20 on the basis of knowing N a t implicitly involves forecasting cohort-specific mortality rates over the period from t to t + 20. For simplicity, the individual's forecasts of all elements of the future environment are assumed to be point estimates: equivalently, there is uncertainty about individual premature mortality, but none about the future mortality profile itself or future fertility. The world being what it is, this assumption is a lot to swallow; but the calibration will be virtually impossible without it.
Investments in education at the secondary and tertiary levels in period t will yield pay-offs to both age groups in future periods, albeit tempered by the chances of an untimely death, and these expectations will enter into their calculations. Since implementing the whole under full rational expectations would entail a research project in itself, we choose a (comparatively) simple procedure. As assumed above, consumption in the second phase of adult life, namely, ρc t+20 , is determined by a social rule under which the decisions of neighbouring cohorts of young adults have a strong influence on the outcome. Given the complexity of the associated forecasting problem with which young adults are confronted, we assume that they approach it as follows.
First, ρc t+20 is taken to be a fixed fraction, ζ, of full income per adult in the first phase of life in period t + 20, net of taxes:
Observe that the terms N ) the cohort that follows will choose is something that the young adults at t must guess when deciding on (e ) -and more distant future choices, to the extent that these are relevant. That is, they employ the rule
In arriving at their decision at t, however, they take E t e a t+10 as parametrically given, that is, they view Λ t+20 as only directly influenced by (e 1 t , e 2 t ) when they calculate the optimum. Only after the optimum has been found does (16) come into play. Having cut this particular Gordian knot, we can then solve the model sequentially, one period at a time.
The said individual's decision problem takes the following form:
subject to: (1), (2), (5), (14) . If f 1 (·) is strictly concave, E t U (·) will be strictly concave in (c t , e The associated Lagrangian is
The first-order conditions are
and
As can be seen from (1), (2) and (15), the derivatives of c t+20 and λ 3 t+20 involve very long and messy expressions, which are suppressed here. (16) when solving the first-order conditions therefore opens up the possibility that there is more than one pair (e 1 t , e 2 t ) that will satisfy them -in effect, there may be more than one equilibrium path.
Calibration
To determine the parameters and past variables of interest, we need to go back deep into the past century, and since censuses were carried out in 1948, 1962, 1969, 1979, 1989 and 1999, it is natural to choose the time-points, or periods, as t = 10, 20, . . . , 100, . . . , where 100 denotes the year 2000. Morbidity and mortality from AIDS became significant after 1990, so that some aspects of the calibration of the model may be restricted to the period 1910 to 1990. We proceed in two steps.
Step 1: Human Capital and Output
Eqs. (1) and (3), together with the specialisation of f 1 (·) to the iso-elastic form (e We employ the following criteria to define the restrictions and select the solution.
First, we use additional information to identify the possible points in time when struc-tural breaks in α t and z t occurred. Second, we vary exogenously and the timing of a possible structural break in z 
which is set out in Table 1 , reveals that Kenya suffered, first, a marked slowdown in the growth of y t in the 1980s, and then a further turn for the worse in the form of an actual fall in y t the 1990s. Since e 1 t continued to rise somewhat, even up to 1990, this slowdown and subsequent decline must have arisen from one or more sharp reductions in α t or z 1 t after 1980. With a peak to be explained, it is hard to pin the blame on the productivity factor α t alone. Rather, intuition suggests that the transmission factor z 1 t may have declined first, thereby braking the growth of λ t , with a subsequent fall in α t to produce the retreat in y t . There are good grounds for supposing that the quality of schooling declined substantially in the late 1970s, with a surge in enrolments, overcrowded classrooms and an influx of poorly trained teachers.
As a working hypothesis, therefore, we impose the following restrictions: 
with the possibility of an earlier break in z 
Step 2: Preferences
In a purely formal sense, the first stage of the calibration can be carried out quite Recalling that e 2 t = 0 during this period, we may drop (21) and seek an expression in e 1 t alone. Some manipulation using (14) , (15) , (19) and (20) 
where the first term on the LHS is obtained from (1) and, apart from a limiting case, (24) holds as a strict equality when e 1 t < 1. Observe that (24) is independent of the social sharing rules, as expressed by the parameters β and ρ, a feature that stems from the choice of a logarithmic sub-utility function for consumption.
The first stage of the calibration yields complete descriptions of the current envi-ronment for the years 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980 and 1990 . Where the associated future environments are concerned, we assume that agents possessed perfect foresight, except for the timing of the outbreak of the epidemic and its immediate consequences. In this regard, the data in Table 1 and the demographic data up to 1990 suffice for 1950 and 1960. Thereafter, we need progressively more. In view of (11) (2004) , and q t is reported in Table 1 . As for the question of whether the outbreak of the epidemic featured in expectations about the future at that time, it is surely safe to rule out this possibility -except, possibly, for 1990. The cumulative number of deaths due to AIDS was still rather small in relation to the population in 1990, and the prevalence rate at that time was also low. It seems very plausible, therefore, that the overwhelming majority of Kenyans had not, at that time, come to recognise the dimensions of the wave of mortality that was about to befall them. In any case, that is the position we adopt for the purposes of calibration.
It still remains to estimate the series {σ
. According to a survey of some 6000 farm households, representatively drawn from districts in six of Kenya's eight provinces in 1981-82, no less than 20 percent of total expenditure on average was devoted to education (Evenson and Mwabu, 1995: 12-15) . For the purposes of calibration, we assume that this proportion stayed constant from 1950 until the mid 1980s, though it seems a bit questionable in the early years, when school-places were rather rationed.
By the mid 1990s, there is reliable evidence that this budget proportion had fallen substantially (Kenya, 1996) . In calibrating the model, therefore, no use will be made of the year 1990.
The number of equivalent, full-time schoolchildren in period t is e 
Substituting
where the poll tax τ t is zero throughout the period 1950-90. Since only interior solutions are observed in this period, (26) will hold as a strict equality for the purposes of calibration. (26) is that there is some evidence that school-places were rationed somewhat in 1950 and 1960. In judging the constellation of values from both stages combined, we note that the quantity 1−b 2 /b 1 is the rate of pure impatience, for the probability of prematurely dying as an adult, q t , is already allowed for in the specification of E t U . Although we are unaware of any attempts to estimate this rate for Kenya, two well-known studies for the U.S. suggest that it lies between 0.25 and 0.5 per cent per annum (Altig et al., 1996; Fullerton and Rogers, 1993) . On this basis, we reject any constellation for Kenya that yields an implied rate of pure impatience much exceeding 1 per cent per annum. Tables 1 and 2 report two plausible constellations that meet this criterion. In the first, the implied rate is 1.23 per cent, in the second,
Selection

per cent per annum. It is also noteworthy that φ(·) is roughly midway between
the logarithmic (η = 0) and the Ramsey (η = 1) cases, which confirms the importance of not forcing the entire preference structure into a logarithmic straitjacket.
The adverse developments in the production of human capital and output that began around 1980 express themselves in the behaviour of z t and α t . In solution 1, the first break, in 1960, is a small one; it is followed by a very sharp fall in 1980, which leaves Since f 1 (1) = 1 under the specialisation adopted for the purposes of calibrating the model, it follows at once that the said condition is violated in both solutions, so that a continuation of these values of z 1 t without investments in secondary education imply that λ 2 t will converge, at best, on the stationary values 1/(1 − 2 × 0.41) = 5.56 and 1/(1 − 2 × 0.43) = 7.14, respectively. This finding indicates the pressing importance of improving the performance of the primary school system and of promoting secondary schooling in order to ensure long-run growth. To complete the picture, note that the productivity of a school-aged child, γ, is estimated to be about 70 per cent of that of an uneducated adult in both solutions. This seems a little high, perhaps, but it is not outlandish.
Summing up, there is little to choose between solutions 1 and 2, except that the course of z t is noticeably smoother in the former, so we plump for 1.
Secondary Education
Recall that the function f 2 (·) is assumed to satisfy the conditions that it yield the observed net secondary enrollment rate in 2000, namely, e 2 100 = 0.065, and that the asymptotic rate of growth of λ 3 t when all cohorts enjoy full primary and secondary education (e 
Given the fact that the system converges rather slowly to the asymptotic growth rate from above, its growth rate will exceed Ndulu and O'Connell's estimate of 2 per cent a year even over the later stretch of our time horizon. We have 
Demographic Projections for 1990 -2050
In order to estimate the effects of the epidemic and to evaluate public policies designed to combat it, we need the corresponding demographic projections. These include the natural counterfactual case in which the epidemic never breaks out and variations in which it does so -with or without policy interventions. In undertaking this rather speculative task, we shall draw heavily on the projections made by the U.S. In what follows, the counterfactual 'without the epidemic' and the actual case 'with the epidemic' will be denoted by D = 0 and D = 1, respectively. Both projections are based on a whole variety of assumptions, which are known to its authors at the USCB, but are not reported in the data file made available to us. By 1990, it was apparent that the epidemic had started to take hold, though the number of annual deaths was still very modest and the virulence of its course was difficult to forecast. This date is therefore not only a natural 'break point' in the calibration of the model, but also a natural point of departure for the construction of alternative demographic projections.
The projections
In view of the differences between our 'revised' estimates of the demographic structure and 2000 reveals that the former are so much higher than the latter that reconstruction of the USCB's counterfactual estimates for 2000-2050 rather than mere smoothing is called for. This preliminary conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the USCB's relatively low initial levels are also followed by steep projected declines in age-specific mortality rates out to 2050. In reconstructing the USCB's estimates for the counterfactual in the direction of higher mortality, we err, therefore, on the side of optimism. series, to which our modification of the USCB (D = 0) series is closely anchored until 2020, is somewhat higher than that in the USCB's (D = 0) series itself. To this extent, the series for D = 1 in Table 4 represents a more conservative estimate of the level of mortality in the presence of AIDS than the USCB's (D = 1), since by no means all those who die of AIDS would have died at the same age of other causes. The use of the series in Tables 3 and 4 as reference cases therefore involves a somewhat more conservative stance than that implicit in the USCB series where both the size of the initial 'shock' to mortality and the general level of mortality are concerned.
With this reservation, the size of the shock to the level of premature adult mortality can be represented by the difference between the summary statistics 20 q 20 (D = 1) and 20 q 20 (D = 0). These statistics are reported in Table 5 . Since the chances that a mortality shock will bring about an economic collapse depend on its duration as well as its size, it is desirable to do some sensitivity analysis. As a variation on D = 1, therefore, we prolong the shock by a full decade in the following way. In 2010, we repeat the age-specific mortality profile for 2000 and push those for 2010, 2020, . . . out one decade into the future. The age pyramids in Table 4 
The benchmark cases
The evolution of the entire system is determined by the extended household's decisions (c t , e 1 t , e 2 t ) at each point in time, which then determine, in turn, the formation of new human capital through the educational technology, as specified in (1) and (2) . Put formally, given the current environment Z t and future environment Z e t , as forecast by the household's decision-makers, and given the assumption of stationary expectations concerning future investments in education, the household solves problem (17) for period t. In doing so, it determines some of the elements of Z t+10 and Z Table 1 ). The main reason for this discrepancy is that the chosen value of σ 1 90 relates to the mid 1990s, at which time its level appears to have been markedly lower than in the mid 1980s (Appleton et al., 1999, Table 6 ). Unable to find any estimates for the intervening years, we choose the later of the two, thereby erring on the optimistic side. With the promise of declining mortality and no further adverse shocks to z t and α t , and with sufficient human capital accumulated in the past, the expected pay-off to primary education rises with accumulation, and so ensures the continuation of the process.
Where secondary education is concerned, the series broadly accords with intuition.
With relatively low current mortality and the prospect of falling levels in the future, Table 1 ). By 2040, however, a primary school graduate will be about 60 per cent more productive than her counterpart 50 years earlier, a improvement that owes not a little to her parents' secondary education. 
Public policy
In this setting, there are three domains in which interventions can promote growth and welfare, namely, health, education and the conduct of economic policy. Measures designed to combat the epidemic are not only intrinsically valuable because they reduce the toll of suffering and death, but they also promote investments in education by increasing the family's lifetime resources and the expected returns to such investments.
In contrast, measures that promote education directly, for example, school-attendance subsidies, have no demographic effects in our model -an assumption that demands great care when making comparisons of policies across these two domains. Improvements in the general conduct of economic policy manifest themselves in increases in α and thence in families' full income. They have no effect on the long-run rate of growth in this framework, and are not considered here.
In what follows, the model is not 'closed' where public finance is concerned; for the budgetary outlays entailed by the interventions analysed below are financed not by domestic taxes, but rather by outright grants from abroad. Kenya has been quite heavily dependent on budgetary support of this kind in the past -though it should be added that its present prospects are clouded by the fact that corruption continues unabated under the latest government. Be that as it may, we adopt this simplifying assumption. Closing the model by introducing the government's budget constraint and associated tax instruments would involve a substantial increase in complexity. 
Public spending and mortality
Interventions aimed at altering the course of mortality in the presence of the epidemic produce variants of the benchmark D = 1. In order to formulate them precisely, it is necessary to establish the relationship between the level of spending on measures to contain the epidemic and treat those infected and the profile of age-specific mortality.
For this purpose, we draw heavily on both the procedure and estimates in Bell, Devarajan and Gersbach (2006). In essence, this involves choosing a functional form for the relationship between the probability of premature death among adults and the level of aggregate expenditures on combating the disease. Bell, Devarajan and Gersbach argue 5 Some idea of what is involved can be obtained from the corresponding sections of Bell, Devarajan and Gersbach (2006), whose two-generation OLG model for South Africa has a much simpler structure.
that when the main source of this mortality is AIDS, the efficacy of such spending depends directly on the number of (sub-) families, N F t , within the fictional extended family that makes up the whole society. Aggregate public spending is then written as N F t G t , where G t is the level of spending per sub-family in period t.
For simplicity, and erring on the side of optimism, we assume that such aggregate expenditures produce a pure public good, so that ridding the relationship of the size of the population, we write
where the function q t (G t ; D = 1) is to be interpreted as the efficiency frontier of the set of all measures that can be undertaken to reduce q t in period t. We also assumeand this seems sensible -that the effects of these expenditures last for only the period in which they are made. Although very little is known about the exact shape of q t (·), our definition of the benchmark D = 1 implies that q t (0; D = 1) should yield the estimates in Table 5 . A second, plausible, condition is that arbitrarily large spending on combating the epidemic should lead to the restoration of the status quo ante, that is, q t (∞; D = 1) = q t (D = 0) in all periods. It is also desirable to choose a functional form that not only possesses an asymptote, but also allows sufficient curvature over some relevant interval of G t , so the natural choice falls on the four-parameter logistic:
With four parameters to be estimated, two additional, independent conditions are required. One way of proceeding is to pose the question: what is the marginal effect of efficient spending on q t in high-and low-prevalence environments, respectively?
Equivalently, we need estimates of the derivatives of q t (G t ; D = 1) at G t = 0 and some value of G t that corresponds to heavy spending, when the scope for using cheap interventions has been exhausted. Table 8 . The associated functions q t (G t ; D = 1) are plotted in Figure 1 . It should be remarked that the approach employed in deriving these results rests on a rather sharp distinction between preventive measures and treatment. Some would argue, however, that such a distinction is not always easy to draw, especially in highprevalence environments. Granted as much, the general import for our approach is clear: the absolute slopes of the functions in Figure 1 at G t = 0 are too large; for in these settings, there are many infected individuals other than prostitutes and truckdrivers, and the cost-efficient bundle of interventions at low levels of spending will also involve HAART, at least in some measure.
School-attendance subsidies
The two reference cases involve the following levels of the direct costs of education: 
Health or education?
It would be unrealistic to expect indefinite budgetary support for such programmes. Table 9 ). For the purposes of comparing interventions in the two domains, the alternative is to allocate the same stream to measures designed to combat the epidemic, as summarised in the function q t (G t ; D = 1), where (G 100 , G 110 , G 120 ) is suitably normalised to (A 100 , A 110 , A 120 ) in order to allow for the difference in the unit of observation (family and entire cohort of youth, respectively).
As can be seen from a comparison of Tables 7 and 9 , the programme of subsidies to secondary education produces a fairly substantial effect on e 2 t , and hence indirectly on λ 2 t . In 2040, the productivity of both primary and secondary school graduates will lie almost exactly half way between their respective levels in the reference cases D = 0, 1.
The same holds for GDP per adult. Put somewhat differently, the programme reduces the delay in attaining the counterfactual levels from ten years to five.
If these funds were allocated instead to combating the epidemic, not only would there be a substantial fall in mortality -which is desirable in itself -but the associated improvement in expectations would also promote investment in secondary education.
The latter effect is small at first, but then gathers pace, with a startling jump between Table 10 ). The lags involved are sufficiently drawn out, however, that y 140 is still 5 per cent lower. The reductions in mortality would lead to a more numerous population in 2040 (by about 10 per cent), and in 2050 new graduates are more productive. It is this consequence of spending on measures to reduce premature adult mortality that make them socially profitable against the alternative of spending directly on education -at least when the time horizon is long enough.
Yet another alternative is to combine the two programmes. Table 11 reports the results from spending half the stream of educational subsidies paid out under the 'pure' programme σ 2 t = 400 (see Table 9 ) on measures to combat the epidemic and treat its victims, while reducing the educational subsidy from 400 to 200. This combined programme would cost 0.82 per cent of GDP in 2000, 1.20 per cent in 2010 and 1.79 Tables 9, 10 
Cost-benefit analysis
In view of the very different time paths of the streams of costs and benefits of these three interventions, an evaluation of their social profitability demands that they be discounted at an appropriate (real) rate. Four percent seems quite appropriate for public sector projects in Africa, for there is always the alternative of investing in international paper of good quality. To be on the safe side, we also set the bar a bit higher -at 5 percent. Deciding on an appropriate welfare index is not at all straightforward, because one of the policy instruments -education subsidies -will not save lives, so that troubling ethical problems arise in comparing the above programmes.
One crude, but defensible, way of proceeding is to use per capita and aggregate GDP, respectively, as (instantaneous) indices. Since only the latter gives any weight to the number of individuals actually alive -and then equally -these two indices arguably bracket the range of possibilities when output is the underlying measure of performance. Table 12 reports the net present values of the streams of costs and benefits generated by the three programmes, whereby the streams of benefits after 2040 are interpolated from the differences in growth rates between 2030 and 2040 with and without the intervention, respectively, and then discounted over an infinite horizon. Linear interpolation is used to arrive at the estimates for all intervening years within each decade. All three programmes pass the test with flying colours whatever be the choice of index; but the two that involve the promotion of health have a benefit-cost ratio that is roughly fourto five-fold that involving educational subsidies alone. This striking improvement is due not only to the saving of lives, but also to the fact that the resulting reduction in expected mortality provides an additional potent incentive to invest in education.
Concluding discussion
From about 1980 onwards, Kenya has run into increasing difficulties in three separate, but related spheres, all of which pose serious threats to its citizens' long-term prosperity and well-being. The first is a significant weakening of the mechanism through which human capital is transmitted and accumulated from one generation to the nextso much so, that in the absence of improvements in the primary school system and significant levels of secondary and higher education, the level of output per head may well approach a ceiling not very many times higher than that ruling at present. The second is a fall in the productivity of human capital, measured in terms of aggregate output, a fall that surely has much to do with failings in policy-making and governance during the past two decades.
The third is the outbreak of the AIDS epidemic, whose effects on mortality and morbidity became evident by the early 1990s. A useful summary measure of the epidemic's economic effects is that, in the absence of any public intervention, it will delay by about a decade the attainment of the levels of human capital in 2040 under the counterfactual in which there is no outbreak.
The damage caused by these developments is not simply additive; rather they interact in mutually reinforcing ways. Conversely, measures designed to remedy failings in one sphere will relieve the problems in the other two, in part at least. Indeed, the results for a combined programme of measures in the spheres of health and education reveal a definite synergy among them. It is for this reason that any programme to combat the spread of the epidemic, to treat its victims and to support needy families must be complemented by reforms in the educational system and in economic policy in general.
All three elements play a central role in determining the expected returns to investment in human capital, and hence the rate of growth over the long haul.
Where future work is concerned, we think it important to introduce the effects of learning on the job where the young are concerned. Translating freshly derived educational attainment into output of goods and services is not accomplished overnight;
rather it can be likened to the maturing of wine. The waiting involved will reduce the earnings, and hence the opportunity costs, of primary school graduates; but it will also delay the stream of expected returns from all education. What the net effect turns out to be is a matter of more than academic interest.
